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Abstract
In this paper we investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI between countries of
different size when a welfare-maximizing and relatively inefficient public firm is the incum-
bent in the largest market. First, we analyze how the presence of a public firm affects
the investment decision of a multinational operating in the same sector as the former and
willing to serve both markets. When the public firm stops exporting to the small country
due to the investment of the multinational in the region (or does not export altogether),
policy competition between the two countries is irrelevant to the foreign firm’s choice. But
if the country receiving FDI has to pay a subsidy, only the multinational will be better off
provided that it would have invested there anyway absent policy competition. By contrast,
when the public firm exports to the small country, policy competition increases the attrac-
tiveness of the big country. Second, we show that privatizing the public firm makes the
big country a relatively more attractive location for the investment. However, when the
privatized firm stays in the market, welfare always decreases. After privatization, policy
competition decreases the attractiveness of the big country, which may be willing to tax
the multinational in order to discourage FDI from taking place there, and gives the small
country the opportunity of benefiting from the investment.
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1 Introduction
One of the most well documented trends in the world economy over the last two decades
has been the rise in foreign direct investments (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs).
At an aggregate level, the empirical evidence indicates that, due to the existence of trade
costs, FDI grew rapidly in the last 15 years of the 20th century, far outpacing the growth
of international trade among industrialized countries.1 Moreover, because of the widely held
advantages of receiving FDI (e.g., cheaper or higher-quality goods for domestic consumers,
technological spillovers to domestic producers, job creation, etc.), an increasing number of
national governments offer MNEs countervailing incentives to attract their investments and
competition mostly takes place at an intra-regional level, i.e., between countries belonging
to the same economic area (e.g., Latin America, South-East Asia, Eastern Europe, and so
on).2 In spite of that, FDI by foreign MNEs can be an issue to the extent that foreign firms
investing in a country often operate in the same sector as some incumbent local firm, which is,
in some cases, a public enterprise.3 In recent years, however, parallel to the massive increase
in FDI, privatizations have become an important tool of industrial restructuring in all parts
of the world. As the following quotation suggests, “Since 1990, European governments have
sold more than $450 billion worth of state assets in many different sectors, including the
banking, insurance, telecommunication and automobile industries. Many countries are also
announcing substantial forthcoming privatizations.” (Norba¨ck and Persson, 2005, p. 635).
And privatization waves are not confined to the European Union.4
Therefore, when we think about the relationship between FDI, public firms and privati-
zation, a lot of questions arise: how does the presence of a public firm affect the investment
decision of a MNE operating in the same sector as the former? How does it affect policy com-
petition for FDI between two countries of different size? Does privatization allows a country to
attract FDI? Does it improve welfare in the country receiving the investment? In this paper,
we try to provide an answer to some of the previous questions. In particular, we study how the
presence of a welfare-maximizing public firm affects the investment decision of a foreign MNE
and the intensity of policy competition between countries, i.e., between potential alternative
locations for the investment. In addition, we discuss the impact of privatization not only on
the FDI decision of the MNE but also on attractiveness and welfare of the country hosting
the formerly-public firm. By “privatization”, we mean a transfer in ownership rights from the
government to domestic private investors, which simply translates into a change in the firm’s
objective function.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the literature on mixed oligopoly has generally focused
on the optimal behavior of the public firm, the characterization of market equilibria and
1See, e.g., Markusen (1995), Markusen and Venables (1998), and Barba Navaretti et al. (2004).
2For an overview of this issue, see Oman (2001).
3For instance, in the Norwegian oil industry, the state-owned Statoil competes with two MNEs, Esso Norge
and Norske Shell.
4In the 1990s, for example, Russia privatized its aircraft industry, Colombia its state-owned automobile
maker Colombia Automotriz, and Argentina pursued a policy of selective privatization.
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the effects of privatization by adapting the standard models of oligopolistic competition to
the welfare-maximizing behavior of public firms.5 More recently, closer attention has been
paid to international mixed oligopoly given that the public firm’s behavior is sensitive to
the nationality of its private competitor (Fjell and Pal, 1996; Fjell and Heywood, 2002). In
particular, some work has been devoted to the analysis of instruments, such as production
subsidies, that are alternative to direct public provision (Pal and White, 1998; Sepahvand,
2004); to the study of partial privatization and optimum tariffs (Chao and Yu, 2006); or to
make the timing of competition endogenous (Cornes and Sepahvand, 2003; Matsumura, 2003).
Other contributions (Norba¨ck and Persson, 2004; 2005) have studied competition between
foreign and domestic private firms as potential buyers of state-owned assets which are sold at
an auction during the privatization process.
In the present paper, we apply the analysis of international mixed oligopoly to a context
where two active governments seek to attract FDI by a foreign firm from a third country. Our
theoretical framework builds on the literature about policy competition for FDI. Namely, on
those contributions considering imperfect market competition, country-size asymmetries, and
intra-regional trade costs.6 This strand of the literature grows out of the paper by Haufler and
Wooton (1999)(henceforth H&W), which analyzes tax competition between two countries of
unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist.7 Even if both countries are willing
to offer a subsidy to the firm, in equilibrium the large country “wins” the competition for FDI
since the firm prefers locating in the big market in order to save on trade costs; moreover, if
the country-size difference is great enough, the large country may be able to levy a positive
lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profit. Ferrett and Wooton (2005) extend H&W’s model to
study policy competition for FDI by two firms from the same industry producing homogeneous
goods in either of the two countries. When country-size asymmetry is “small”, one firm locates
in each country and all of the firms’ profits are taxed away by host countries; on the contrary,
when country-size asymmetry is “large”, the big country is able to attract both firms by taxing
them due to its “market access” advantage. Hence, since firms are taxed in both equilibria,
a general conclusion stemming from this paper is that tax competition under duopoly does
not create a “race to the bottom” in corporate tax rates. Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) modify
5See Rees (1984), Bo¨s (1986), de Fraja and Delbono (1989), and Beato and Mas-Colell (1984).
6The traditional public finance approach to tax competition between countries of different size seems to
be more appropriate when dealing with competition for portfolio investments rather than for FDI since trade
costs are typically not accounted for and factor and product markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991) and Kanbur and Keen (1993) represent the cornerstones of this line of
research.
7A different set of papers looks at two-country policy competition by incorporating positive (or negative)
spillovers from FDI. The presence of potential benefits from the investment – due to the existence of, e.g.,
regional unemployment, vertical industry linkages with domestic producers and agglomeration effects, tech-
nological spillovers, etc. – induces countries to a subsidy competition to attract the foreign MNE. See, for
instance, Black and Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta (1996), Haaland and Wooton (1999), Barros and Cabral (2000),
and Fumagalli (2003). By contrast, when the location of a foreign firm causes negative externalities for the
host country (e.g. by polluting its environment), policy competition may result in excessively high tax rates.
See Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995).
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H&W’s set-up by introducing a private firm – in the big country – which competes with
the foreign investor on the regional market. In the absence of policy competition, the FDI
decision is driven by a trade-off between the advantage of locating in the big market (“market
size” effect) and the benefit of being a monopolist in the small market (“competition” effect).
When countries offer relatively similar location advantages, policy competition is fierce and
leads both countries to offer an investment subsidy; this, in turn, may decrease regional (i.e.,
the sum of the two countries’) welfare. Otherwise, policy competition is less intense and the
resulting equilibrium policy is an investment tax which still attracts the foreign investor. An
interesting result is that aggregate welfare (the sum of regional welfare and the investor’s
profits) rises whenever the introduction of policy competition changes the investor’s location
decision. Finally, Haufler and Wooton (2006) develop a three-country model of competition
for FDI between a union of two countries and a third potential-host country. As trade costs
are assumed to be lower on trade within the union than between the union and the outside
country, if the firm settles in one of the union countries, it enjoys a location rent whose size
depends on the relative costs for trade within and outside the union and on the relative size of
the three different markets. Two types of gains for the union emerge when regional tax/subsidy
policies are coordinated and the union as a whole still competes with the third country: first,
for investments that would have taken place in the union in the absence of coordination,
coordination allows an increase in equilibrium taxes (or a decrease in equilibrium subsidies)
which transfers location rents from the firm to the union countries; second, by internalizing
the benefits to all union members from the location of a foreign production plant, the union as
a whole may be able to attract the firm by means of a lower tax (or a higher subsidy) whereas
non-cooperative policies of its members would have led the firm to settle outside the region.
In our paper, we modify H&W’s model by assuming that the incumbent in the big country
is a welfare-maximizing and relatively inefficient public firm which competes with a foreign firm
on the regional market. First, we show that both countries enjoy higher welfare by receiving
FDI, hence are willing to offer a positive subsidy to attract the foreign firm. However, if the
public firm does not export to the small country (either a priori or due to entry of the MNE on
the regional market), policy competition turns out to be irrelevant to the FDI decision; this,
in turn, implies that the investment decision of the MNE absent policy competition maximizes
aggregate welfare. By contrast, if the public firm exports to the small country, there is an
extra-benefit for the big country from receiving FDI, and policy competition increases the
attractiveness of the latter. As a second step, we find that privatization of the formerly-
public firm may entail a trade-off between attractiveness and welfare from the big country’s
perspective. We further show that after privatization, tax/subsidy competition increases the
attractiveness of the small country as the big one is willing to tax the MNE in order to protect
the domestic industry from a more efficient foreign competitor. But policy competition can
also decrease the negative impact of privatization on welfare since the big country may be
able to tax away part of the profit gain for the MNE from investing there.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate our basic theoretical
framework where the incumbent in the big country is a welfare-maximizing public firm; then,
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we analyze the investment decision of a foreign MNE absent policy competition; and, lastly,
we study whether and how this decision changes when the two countries compete in lump-
sum profit taxes/subsidies in order to attract FDI. In Section 3, we evaluate the effects of
privatization of the public firm both on the investment decision of the MNE and on welfare of
the big country and investigate the role of tax/subsidy competition in such a modified set-up.
Finally, in Section 4, we summarize the main conclusions emerging from our work.
2 FDI decision in the presence of a public firm
In this Section, we present the basic model we use to analyze the investment decision of a
multinational firm when the incumbent in the big market is a public welfare-maximizing and
relatively inefficient firm. We derive the profit-maximizing investment choice in the absence
and in the presence of policy competition between two countries which can potentially host
the foreign firm. Finally, we compare the results we obtain in these two situations and show
that tax/subsidy competition is irrelevant to the FDI decision of the MNE when the public
firm does not export to the small country whereas it works in favor of the big country when
the public firm serves both markets.
2.1 The basic set-up
We develop a model in which a firm from a third-country (we will refer to it as firm 1, the
MNE or the foreign firm) has to decide in which of two countries to invest in order to provide
some final good to the consumers of the whole region.8
The markets of the two countries are of unequal size. Namely, in line with Haufler and
Wooton (1999), we assume that there is a single consumer in country A and n ≥ 1 identical
consumers in country B. Hence, when n > 1, country B represents the “big” market for the
final good. While no production takes place in the small country, the big country already
hosts a welfare-maximizing public enterprise (firm 0).9 The public firm sells the same good
as the MNE and serves the small market through exports. However, it is less efficient than
the MNE, i.e., it produces the final good at a higher marginal cost, c0 > c1 ≥ 0, with ci
denoting the constant marginal production cost of firm i = 0, 1. As for the MNE, providing
the good to consumers of both countries requires an investment since trade costs associated
with exporting from the residence country to the region are assumed to be prohibitively high.
Hence, the MNE has to incur a fixed cost F > 0 to establish a production plant in either
8As an example, we can think of a German multinational which has to pick one location between Argentina
and Chile where to build a production plant with the purpose of servicing the consumers of this South American
region.
9We do not exclude from the outset the symmetric-country case, which simply requires n = 1. However, we
do not consider the case where the public firm operates in the small country, which is equivalent to n < 1. As
it will become evident below, this leads to the trivial conclusion that the MNE always prefers to invest in the
biggest country with no local competitor.
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country and some per unit trade costs τ > 0 to serve the other market.10
If we denote by qij the quantity of the final good sold by firm i on country j’s market
(j = A,B), we can write the total cost function of firms 0 and 1 as follows:
C0 (q0A , q0B ) = c0 (q0A + q0B ) + τq0A (1)
C1 (q1A , q1B ) = F + c1 (q1A + q1B ) + τ (IAq1A + IBq1B ) (2)
where Ij = 0 if FDI goes to j and Ij = 1 otherwise.
The two firms face linear demands given by
QA(pA) = α− pA and QB (pB ) = n (α− pB ) (3)
where Qj = q0j + q1j and pj are the total quantity and the price to consumers on country j’s
market, respectively. Production and trade costs are assumed not to exceed the consumers’
maximal willingness to pay, i.e., c0 , c1 , τ ≤ α. To keep our analysis as simple as possible,
we normalize firm 1’s marginal production cost to 0 (i.e., c1 = 0) and set α = 1, so that
c0 , τ ∈ [0, 1].
The objective of the public firm is to maximize welfare in country B, which corresponds
to the sum of consumer surplus and firm 0’s profits:
WB (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = CSB (QB ) + Π0 (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) (4)
The MNE is instead interested in maximizing profits whose amount depends on where it
locates its production plant:11
Πj
1
(q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ) = pA (QA) q1A + pB (QB ) q1B − C1 (q1A , q1B ) , j = A,B (5)
Once the MNE has decided in which country to locate production, firms compete a` la
Cournot on the two markets.12 The linearity of costs allows firms to choose the quantity
produced for, say, country A’s market independently of that produced for country B’s market.
Then, the public firm’s reaction functions are given by:
q0A = max
{
1− c0 − τ
2
− q1A
2
, 0
}
and q0B = max {n (1− c0) , 0}
First of all, we must stress that the public firm’s output choice for its domestic market is
independent of the MNE’s behavior due to the linearity assumptions. Notice also that firm
0 acts as a profit-maximizer in country A. By contrast, it always realizes negative profits
10In what follows, we assume that the fixed cost F is symmetric across countries and so high that it will never
be profitable for the MNE to pay it twice but not so high to make FDI in the favorite country unprofitable.
11Throughout the paper, the superscript indicates the country where the MNE invests. In what follows, we
will drop the subscript 1 from the expression denoting the MNE’s profits in order to ease the notation.
12We get qualitatively similar results by allowing for endogenous timing in the order of moves by firms.
Relying on Cournot competition to illustrate our conclusions is a way to facilitate the exposition.
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on its domestic market.13 In fact, if the MNE were owned by domestic residents, the public
firm would maximize welfare by applying the usual marginal-cost pricing rule which leads to
zero profits. However, as the MNE is owned by residents of a third country, the public firm
does not take into account the negative effect of its quantity decision on the rival’s profits.
Hence, it produces a larger quantity which lowers consumer price to a level below its marginal
production cost.
The discussion above implies that the public firm may earn negative overall profits. Indeed,
while profits from exports to the small country will always be nonnegative – provided that
exporting is a viable option – the public firm always runs losses on its domestic market. In
this case, we postulate that lump-sum transfers from country B’s residents occur in order to
balance the firm’s deficit.
The reaction functions of the foreign firm can be written as:
q1A = max
{
1− IAτ
2
− q0A
2
, 0
}
and q1B = max
{
n
1− IBτ
2
− q0B
2
, 0
}
(6)
Straightforward computations yield equilibrium quantities for the two firms. On the one
hand, if the MNE invests in the big country and exports to the small one, we get:
qB
0A
=
1
3
(1− 2c0 − τ) ≥ 0⇐⇒ c0 ≤
1− τ
2
, qB
1A
=
1
3
(1 + c0 − τ) ≥ 0
and
qB
0B
= n (1− c0) ≥ 0, qB1B =
nc0
2
≥ 0
for country A’s and B’s market, respectively. As the MNE is more efficient than the public
firm, its entry on the regional market makes exporting to the small country less profitable.
At some point, when c0 is too high, the public firm is better off by not serving country A
anymore. In such a situation, the MNE will behave as a monopolist on the small country
market by setting qB
1A
= 1−τ2 .
On the other hand, if the MNE locates production in the small country and exports to the
big one, we have:
qA
0A
=
1
3
(1− 2c0 − 2τ) ≥ 0⇐⇒ c0 ≤
1− 2τ
2
, qA
1A
=
1
3
(1 + c0 + τ) ≥ 0
and
qA
0B
= qB
0B
= n (1− c0) ≥ 0, qA1B =
n (c0 − τ)
2
≥ 0⇐⇒ c0 ≥ τ
for country A’s and B’s market, respectively. As the MNE produces in loco, exporting to the
small country becomes even less profitable for the public firm. In particular, when the latter
stops exporting, the MNE’s monopoly output is given by qA
1A
= 12 . However, by locating in
A, the MNE has to incur trade costs to service country B’s consumers. Hence, exporting is
going to be a viable option to the MNE as long as the cost of supplying the final good to the
big country’s market does not exceed the production cost of the local public firm.
13The public firm realizes zero profits on country B’s market when the MNE invests in A and trade costs
exceed firm 0’s marginal production cost. In this situation, the consumers residing in the big country are served
by a public monopoly.
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Figure 1: Relevant areas in the space (τ, c0) with a public firm in B
It is evident that, depending on the values of c0 and τ and on whether FDI by the foreign
firm goes to country A or to country B, we have different market configurations to consider. In
Figure 1 and Table 1, we identify and characterize the relevant areas in the parameter space
(τ, c0). For instance, when c0 > τ and c0 <
1−2τ
2 simultaneously hold (area III in Figure
1), both firms sell positive quantities in both markets independently of where the investment
takes place. But for c0 > τ and c0 >
1−τ
2 (area I), FDI by the foreign firm in the region will
always drive the public firm out of the small country’s market.
FDI in A FDI in B
Area Country A Country B Country A Country B
I MNE monopoly Cournot MNE monopoly Cournot
II MNE monopoly Cournot Cournot Cournot
III Cournot Cournot Cournot Cournot
IV Cournot Public Monopoly Cournot Cournot
V MNE monopoly Public Monopoly Cournot Cournot
VI MNE monopoly Public Monopoly MNE monopoly Cournot
Table 1: Possible market configurations with a public firm in B
2.2 Investment decision of the MNE
In this Section, we analyze the MNE investment choice when a public firm is the incumbent
in country B’s market. The two countries’ governments can compete to attract FDI by the
foreign firm in their own country. In particular, they can either tax or subsidize both local
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consumers and the MNE in a lump-sum fashion. The results we present here are derived in
the absence of tax competition between the two countries or, similarly, for a situation where
the two countries use identical tax/subsidy policies to attract FDI.14
In order to pick the best location for the investment, the MNE compares its operating
profits from doing FDI in country A or in country B. Namely, it invests in, say, A as long as
ΠA > ΠB (7)
When the last condition holds with equality, the MNE is indifferent between investing in A or
in B, and the gain in profits on A’s market of locating in A over B exactly compensates the
gain in profits on B’s market of locating in B over A. Indeed:
ΠA = ΠB ⇐⇒ piA
A
+ piA
B
= piB
A
+ piB
B
⇐⇒ piA
A
− piB
A
= piB
B
− piA
B
(8)
where pik
j
stands for the MNE’s profits on j’s market when FDI goes to country k (j, k = A,B).
When the two countries have the same market size (n = 1), the presence of a public firm
– although less efficient than the MNE – is a strong disincentive to invest in B. Intuitively,
as there exist positive trade costs separating the two markets, the MNE prefers to locate as
distant as possible from its competitor. Hence, it will always invest in A.
In general, however, the investment decision of the MNE is driven by a “market size”, a
“cost”, and a “competition” effect. The “market size” effect is such that, as we let n increase,
the relative profitability of investing in the big country increases and investment is more likely
to take place there. The “cost” effect reflects the efficiency of the incumbent firm in country
B: intuition suggests that the higher c0 , the higher the attractiveness of country B since the
MNE faces a weaker competitor on the big market. But the opposite may be true when the
MNE’s decision of investing in A prevents it from exporting to B as the public firm is very
efficient. In such a case, an increase in c0 may raise the relative profitability of investing in
A. Finally, the “competition” effect is captured by τ . Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006, p. 1896)
claim that “the higher are the trade costs, the more protected are the national markets from
international competition, and the more important is the competition argument in favor of
location in [the small country]”. But this is not always true in our model. Higher trade costs,
indeed, can increase the relative profitability of investing in the big country if the public firm is
inefficient enough and/or country B’s market is relatively large; in such a situation, the MNE
may prefer to locate as close as possible to consumers in B when the profit loss in B from
investing in A exceeds that in A from investing in B. Therefore, the effect of τ on the FDI
decision is ambiguous and depends on the values of c0 and n and on the market configuration
prevailing in the two countries.
Figure 2 illustrates the MNE’s decision for different values of the size-asymmetry parameter
n (i.e., n = 1, 2, 3). Intuitively, for a given value of n, higher trade costs make the MNE prefer
investing in country A in order to be as far as possible from the public firm; however, the
more inefficient the public firm is compared to the MNE, i.e., the higher c0 , the more likely
14We refer the reader to the Appendix for all the computations.
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Figure 2: FDI decision with a public firm in B for n = 1, 2, 3
FDI will go to country B since the MNE faces a weaker competitor on the big market. This
implies that, as τ increases, the c0 that induces the MNE to invest in country B increases as
well, thereby explaining the positive slope of the indifference condition on the (τ, c0)-space.
Whenever the indifference condition has a negative slope, the “cost” and the “competition”
effects work in the same direction: hence, as τ increases, lower values of c0 are needed to keep
the MNE indifferent between A and B.
2.3 Tax/subsidy competition
In this Section, we investigate how the introduction of tax/subsidy competition between the
two countries can affect the investment decision of the MNE. We assume that the country
receiving FDI can levy a lump-sum tax on the foreign firm’s profits or has to offer a lump-sum
subsidy in order to induce the foreign firm to establish a production plant within its frontiers.
We denote country j’s tax/subsidy by Sj , j = A,B. The equilibrium policy will be a lump-
sum tax when the host country already represents the favorite location for the MNE in the
absence of policy competition; otherwise, it will be a lump-sum subsidy which makes the MNE
prefer a country to the other.
In the first instance, we need to identify the maximum subsidy each country is willing to
offer to the MNE in order to attract FDI. We define such a subsidy as the country’s welfare
gain of receiving the investment, i.e., Smax
j
≡ W j
j
−W k
j
, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k, with W k
j
denoting country j’s welfare when FDI goes to country k (j, k = A,B). While welfare in
country B consists of consumer surplus and public firm’s profits and is given by (4), welfare
in country A simply coincides with consumer surplus as no local firm operates there prior to
the MNE’s entry on the regional market. Evidently, country A always benefits from FDI as
consumer surplus is higher by having the final good produced and sold locally instead of being
served through exports. As for country B, we easily show that the same is true, that is welfare
is always higher when the MNE invests there than otherwise. This allows us to state
Proposition 1 In the presence of a welfare-maximizing public firm, the big country always
benefits from the investment of the multinational.
Proof. If the MNE invests in country B, its production for that market is larger than in case
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of FDI in A. Since the public firm’s output for country B’s market is fixed, the MNE’s larger
quantity fully translates into an increase in total output which lowers price, and country B’s
welfare is larger because:
(i) consumers benefit from the lower price on the total quantity that is produced if the
MNE invests in A; hence, given that the loss in public firm’s profits simply represents
a neutral transfer to consumers, there is a net gain in welfare due to the lower price for
the MNE’s quantity;
(ii) consumers also benefit from the larger quantity produced by the MNE;
(iii) if the public firm exports to country A, it enjoys larger profits there since, by investing
in B, the MNE becomes a weaker competitor on that market.
Our result contrasts with the one by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) according to which the
big country “benefits [from FDI] if trade costs and the size of its market are not too large”
(Lemma 2, p. 1897). Their theoretical framework differs from ours in that the big country
hosts a private firm which is as efficient as the MNE. When trade costs are sufficiently high,
the local private firm prefers keeping the MNE as far as possible and the big country benefits
from not receiving FDI as the gain in consumer surplus would not compensate for the loss
in the local firm’s profits.15 The intuition for our result goes the other way round: when
the MNE invests in the big country, consumer surplus of domestic residents always increases
by more than the decrease in profits (e.g., the increase in losses) of the public firm on the
domestic market.
As each country is better off by receiving FDI, both of them are willing to offer a positive
subsidy to the MNE, which will invest in country j if and only if
Πj + Smax
j
> Πk + Smax
k
, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k (9)
i.e., when profits from locating in j – inclusive of the lump-sum subsidy country j offers –
exceed those – subsidy inclusive – from investing in k.
Because of different market size, cost-asymmetry, and the presence of positive costs for
intra-regional trade, it may be possible that the MNE invests in a country where part of its
profits are taxed away in spite of the fact that the other country offers a subsidy. In particular,
provided that country k sets its maximum subsidy, country j receives FDI by setting a positive
lump-sum tax on the MNE’s profits if and only if the following condition holds:
Πj > Πk + Smax
k
, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k (10)
If this were the case, the subsidy country k is able to offer to the MNE cannot offset its
disadvantage relative to country j. For instance, country B attracts the MNE by taxing its
profits when its market is large enough compared to country A’s and the public firm is very
15A similar reasoning applies when the big country’s market is larger enough compared to the small one’s.
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inefficient. By contrast, when the public firm represents a fierce competitor for the big market,
country A receives FDI even if it taxes away part of the MNE’s profits.
The equilibrium policy (subsidy or tax) is the result of an auction where the country
making the most attractive offer receives the investment by the MNE.16 When both countries
offer the maximum subsidy to attract FDI, country j wins the auction if condition (9) holds;
however, country j need not actually pay the maximum subsidy it is willing to offer but just
the one which is necessary to out-bid the rival country, which is given by:
S∗
j
≡ Πk + Smax
k
−Πj > 0, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k (11)
By contrast, when country j represents the most attractive location for FDI without offering
any subsidy and despite the fact that country k offers its maximum affordable subsidy, con-
dition (10) holds. In this case, country j wins the auction by taxing away part of the MNE’s
profits and the equilibrium lump-sum tax is given by:
T ∗
j
≡ Πj −
(
Πk + Smax
k
)
> 0, for j, k = A,B, j 6= k (12)
Figure 3 depicts the MNE’s investment decision for different values of n (i.e., n = 1, 2, 3)
when the two countries compete in lump-sum profit taxes/subsidies to attract FDI. Gray areas
represent the parameter combinations (τ, c0) where one of the two countries receives FDI by
taxing the MNE. When countries are symmetric (n = 1), policy competition does not modify
the FDI decision of the MNE, which always invests in country A where it does not face any
local competitor. Notice that if governments’ are endowed with such a tax policy instrument,
the country hosting the MNE can be better off as it can extract part of its profits. By contrast,
if a country has to pay a subsidy to attract the MNE, which would have invested there anyway
absent tax competition, the MNE enjoys higher profits. In general, although one country’s
welfare is higher when the MNE locates within its borders, tax/subsidy competition turns out
to be a pure waste of resources for the two countries to the extent that it does not change the
investment decision of the foreign firm and the hosting country has to subsidize it.
Figure 3: FDI decision with tax/subsidy competition for n = 1, 2, 3
As a next step, we evaluate whether and how tax/subsidy competition affects the MNE’s
investment decision. As we claim above, if countries are symmetric, the MNE always invests in
16The same equilibrium outcome arises if we assume Bertrand price competition between countries for FDI.
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Figure 4: Impact of tax/subsidy competition on the FDI decision for n = 2, 3, 4
the country where it does not face a local competitor. Therefore, it is instructive to see what
happens when the size of the two markets is different. Figure 4 illustrates the comparison
for n = 2, 3, 4 and gray areas denote the parameter space where policy competition changes
the investment decision of the MNE by making it switch from A to B. Notice that the
MNE’s indifference condition may not be affected by the lump-sum subsidies offered by the
two competing governments. Namely, this turns out to be the case when the public firm serves
just its domestic market. We summarize this result in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 In the presence of a public welfare-maximizing firm which does not export
to the small country, tax/subsidy competition is irrelevant to the investment decision of the
multinational.
Proof. To show this result we rely on the properties of a monopoly with linear cost and
demand. In fact, when the public firm does not export to country A, there is no strategic
interaction between firms since the MNE enjoys monopoly power on the small market and
serves as a monopolist the constant residual demand on the big market. The residual demand
in B is given by:
QResB = n (1− pB )− n (1− c0) = n (c0 − pB ) =⇒ pB = c0 −
QResB
n
Absent tax/subsidy competition, we know from (8) that if the MNE is indifferent between
A and B, the gain in local profits from FDI to A is equal to the gain in local profits from
investing in B. In the presence of tax/subsidy competition, instead, the indifference condition
is given by (9) holding with equality.
Since the public firm always produces the same quantity in B, any change in its own
profits is a neutral transfer to consumers. Then, any change in welfare due to the investment
decision of the MNE is entirely measured by the change in the consumer surplus on the residual
demand, i.e.,
Smax
B
≡WB
B
−WA
B
= CSB
ResB
− CSA
ResB
where CSj
ResB
stands for the consumer surplus on the residual demand in country B’s market
when the MNE invests in country j = A,B. So, from (9), the indifference condition with
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tax/subsidy competition can be rewritten as follows:
piA
A
− piB
A
+ CSA
A
− CSB
A
= piB
B
− piA
B
+ CSB
ResB
− CSA
ResB
(13)
and we can easily show that when (8) holds with equality, then (13) holds true because
CSj
j
− CSk
j
=
1
2
(
pij
j
− pik
j
)
, ∀j, k = {A,ResB} , j 6= k
Consider now a monopoly market with linear (inverse) demand, p = a − bq and cost,
C(q) = cq, so that the equilibrium quantity and price are q∗ = a−c2b and p
∗ = a+c2 . We
analyze the change in consumer surplus and profits due to a change in c by assuming that
marginal costs fall to zero. The new equilibrium quantity and price are q∗∗ = a2b and p
∗∗ = a2 ,
respectively.
The change in consumer surplus has two components:
(i) the effect of the reduction in price on the initial quantity
∆1CS = (p
∗ − p∗∗) q∗ = c (a− c)
4b
(ii) the effect of the increase in quantity
∆2CS =
1
2
(p∗ − p∗∗) (q∗∗ − q∗) = 1
2
c2
4b
Similarly, we can define two components of the change in profits:
(i) the increase in profits on the initial quantity
∆1pi = cq
∗ − (p∗ − p∗∗) q∗ = c
2
q∗ =
c (a− c)
4b
(ii) the profits on the quantity increase
∆2pi = (q
∗ − q∗∗) p∗∗ = ca
4b
and it is immediate to check that the following relations hold:
∆2pi = ∆1CS + 2∆2CS and ∆1pi = ∆1CS =⇒ ∆CS =
1
2
∆pi
In order to apply this result to our framework, let c = τ , a = 1 and b = 1 for country A’s
market, and a = c0 and b =
1
n for country B’s market residual demand.
Proposition 2 is valid both in the case where the public firm does not export to the
small country a priori and when it stops exporting because of the investment of the MNE in
the region. Such an irrelevance result rests on the absence of strategic interaction on both
markets which is essentially due to the fact that the incumbent is a public firm. The MNE,
indeed, enjoys monopoly power on the small market, whereas the public firm always produces
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the same quantity for the big market, where the MNE serves as a monopolist the constant
residual demand. When the MNE is indifferent between investing in A or in B, the gain in
local profits on A’s market of locating in A over B exactly compensates the gain in local
profits on B’s market of locating in B over A. In addition, each country’s welfare gain of
receiving the investment is a fixed proportion of the local profit gain for the MNE. Therefore,
when local profit gains are equal, the same holds for welfare gains, and since welfare gains
represent the maximum subsidy each country is willing to offer to attract FDI, we can argue
that tax/subsidy competition does not modify the MNE’s investment decision.
From Proposition 2, it immediately follows
Corollary 1 In the presence of a public welfare-maximizing firm which does not export to the
small country, when the country receiving FDI has to pay a subsidy, only the multinational
will be better off. In this case, tax/subsidy competition is just a waste of resources for the
region as a whole.
The discussion above also allows us to state
Corollary 2 In the presence of a public welfare-maximizing firm which does not export to the
small country, the investment decision of the MNE absent tax/subsidy competition maximizes
aggregate welfare.
Proof. When the MNE maximizes its overall profits by investing in, say, country A, we have
that ΠA > ΠB. This, together with our previous discussion, implies that
WA
A
+WA
B
> WB
A
+WB
B
Therefore, if we follow Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) and define aggregate welfare as the sum of
the two countries’ welfare and the MNE’s profits, it is straightforward to obtain
WA
A
+WA
B
+ΠA > WB
A
+WB
B
+ΠB
which completes the proof.
Figure 4 further suggests that tax/subsidy competition can affect the MNE’s indifference
condition when the public firm sells the final good in both markets and country B’s market
is relatively big enough. We can thus state
Proposition 3 In the presence of a public welfare-maximizing firm which does export to the
small country, tax/subsidy competition increases the attractiveness of the big country.
Proof. When the MNE invests in country B rather than in country A, it becomes a weaker
competitor on the small market and the public firm always enjoys larger profits there. Thus,
country B can offer a subsidy which enhances its attractiveness relative to A. In fact, the new
indifference condition for the MNE becomes:
piA
A
− piB
A
+ CSA
A
− CSB
A
= piB
B
− piA
B
+ CSB
ResB
− CSA
ResB
+ piB
0A
− piA
0A
(14)
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where the RHS of (14) is larger than in (13) and bigger than its LHS when condition (8) holds.
Differently from the case where the public firm does not export, country B’s welfare gain
of receiving FDI now exceeds country A’s one when the MNE is indifferent absent policy
competition. This implies that the big country can offer the MNE a higher subsidy than the
small country.
Proposition 3 sharply contrasts with the finding by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) according
to which policy competition increases the attractiveness of the small country. The intuition
for our result is straightforward if we refer to Proposition 2. The only difference here is that
there is an extra-benefit for the big country from hosting the MNE. When FDI goes to B,
indeed, the MNE becomes a weaker competitor on the small market, and since the public firm
now earns positive profits from exporting to A, its profits (hence, country B’s welfare) will be
higher.
3 The effects of privatization
In this Section, we modify our basic theoretical framework to account for the effects of pri-
vatization on the investment decision of the MNE. By “privatization”, we mean that the
incumbent firm in country B is no longer owned by the domestic government so that its ob-
jective is to maximize profits instead of welfare. In addition, we assume that the privatized
firm fully remains in the hands of residents of the big country, i.e., no shares in the firm are
sold to foreigners.17
Once again, we determine the profit-maximizing investment choice of the MNE in the
absence and in the presence of policy competition between the two countries. We show that
privatization of the formerly-public firm increases the attractiveness of country B as the lo-
cation of FDI (even when countries are symmetric); however, welfare decreases when the
MNE invests in B if the privatized firm stays in the market. Finally, we analyze the interac-
tion between privatization and policy competition and discuss whether and how tax/subsidy
competition affects the FDI decision of the MNE in this modified set-up.
3.1 The modified set-up
We consider a situation where the government of country B privatizes the public firm by
selling all of the shares in this firm to domestic residents. The privatized firm wants to
maximize its profits – instead of country B’s welfare. As privatization per se does not imply
a decrease in production costs, the only difference with respect to our basic set-up is the
nature of the incumbent firm in B, i.e., the privatized firm’s objective, which is now given by
Π0 (q0A , q0B , q1A , q1B ). Total cost and profit functions of the MNE are unchanged.
17Similarly, we can think that country B’s government has full bargaining power when it sells the firm to
foreign investors and can correctly anticipate the expected profits of the formerly-public firm after privatization.
If this were the case, the government could ask foreign investors a price for the firm which coincides with the
resulting producer surplus.
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After the MNE’s FDI decision has been made, Cournot competition takes place between
the two firms on the two markets. The privatized firm’s reaction functions are given by:
q0A = max
{
1− c0 − τ
2
− q1A
2
, 0
}
and q0B = max
{
n (1− c0)
2
− q1B
2
, 0
}
While the public firm acts as a profit-maximizer just in country A, the privatized firm
maximizes its profits in both markets, so that its output choice for the domestic market is no
longer independent of the MNE’s behavior. Namely, quantities of the two firms are strategic
substitutes in the two markets. Moreover, the privatized firm always earns nonnegative profits
in each country – otherwise, it does not produce for that market. As for the MNE, its reaction
functions are the same as in (6) with q0B denoting here the quantity produced by the privatized
firm for country B’s market.
Since the privatized firm behaves in the same way as the public firm on country A’s
market, privatization does not affect the corresponding equilibrium quantities. By contrast,
privatization does change equilibrium quantities on country B’s market. On the one hand, if
the MNE invests in the big country, we get:
qB
0B
=
n (1− 2c0)
3
≥ 0⇐⇒ c0 ≤
1
2
and qB
1B
=
n (1 + c0)
3
≥ 0
Entry of the relatively more efficient MNE in the region makes domestic production less
profitable for the privatized firm. Due to the presence of positive trade costs, such an argument
is even stronger for exports. Hence, if the privatized firm is not efficient enough, it will be
forced not to produce in order to avoid losses, and the MNE will behave as a monopolist on
both markets by setting qB
1B
= n2 and q
B
1A
= 1−τ2 , respectively.
On the other hand, if the MNE invests in the small country, we have:
qA
0B
=
n (1− 2c0 + τ)
3
≥ 0⇐⇒ c0 ≤
1 + τ
2
and qA
1B
=
n (1 + c0 − 2τ)
3
≥ 0⇐⇒ c0 ≥ 2τ − 1
Although the MNE exports the final good from the small country, if the privatized firm is not
efficient enough, it will not be able to compete with the MNE on the big country’s market. In
this case, the MNE will be a monopolist both in B and in A, where it will sell qB
1B
= n(1−τ)2
and qB
1A
= 12 , respectively. However, if trade costs are sufficiently high relative to c0 , investing
in A may prevent the MNE from serving country B and leave monopoly power on that market
to the privatized firm, which will set qA
0B
=
n(1−c0)
2 .
As in our basic set-up, depending on the values of c0 and τ and on whether FDI goes to
A or to B, we have different market configurations to analyze. Clearly, privatization increases
the number of cases to study since FDI may now drive the incumbent firm out of the big
country’s market. For instance, when c0 >
1+τ
2 , FDI in the region ensures the foreign firm
monopoly power in both markets, independently of where it locates production. By contrast,
when c0 < 2τ − 1, investing in A makes exporting unprofitable for the privatized firm but
leaves it monopoly on the big country’s market. In Figure 5 and Table 2, we identify and
characterize all the relevant areas (i.e., market outcomes) in the parameter space (τ, c0).
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Figure 5: Relevant areas in the space (τ, c0) with a privatized firm in B
FDI in A FDI in B
Area Country A Country B Country A Country B
I MNE monopoly MNE monopoly MNE monopoly MNE monopoly
II MNE monopoly Cournot MNE monopoly MNE monopoly
III MNE monopoly Cournot MNE monopoly Cournot
IV MNE monopoly Cournot Cournot Cournot
V Cournot Cournot Cournot Cournot
VI MNE monopoly Privatized Monopoly Cournot Cournot
VII MNE monopoly Privatized Monopoly MNE monopoly Cournot
VIII MNE monopoly Privatized Monopoly MNE monopoly MNE monopoly
Table 2: Possible market configurations with a privatized firm in B
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3.2 Investment decision of the MNE
We now analyze whether and how privatization of the public firm affects the MNE investment
choice. In this Section, we look at a situation where no policy competition between the two
countries takes place or, similarly, where the two countries use identical tax/subsidy policies
to attract FDI. As before, the foreign firm chooses its favorite location for the investment by
comparing operating profits from doing FDI in country A or in country B.18
In general, privatization decreases the importance of the “cost” effect relative to the “mar-
ket size” effect in driving the investment decision of the MNE. On the big market, the pri-
vatized firm produces as long as its profits are nonnegative and it clearly represents a much
weaker competitor for the MNE than the public firm, which either runs losses or realizes zero
profits from sales. In the small country, instead, privatization does not affect the intensity of
market competition. Therefore, the “cost” effect is less likely to discourage the MNE from
investing in the big country than before privatization, and higher values of n dramatically
increase the attractiveness of country B because of the “market size” effect. In particular, if
the privatized firm is not efficient enough (i.e., c0 >
1
2), the MNE always invests in the big
country as this allows it to be a monopolist on both markets and to serve the relatively large
market without incurring any trade costs.
Figure 6: Impact of privatization on the FDI decision for n = 1, 2, 3
Figure 6 illustrates the FDI choice of the MNE before and after privatization of the in-
cumbent firm on country B’s market. Gray areas represent the parameter space (τ, c0) where
privatization changes the investment decision of the MNE and induces it to locate in country
B. The impact of privatization on the attractiveness of the big country is evident from this
Figure and consistent with our discussion above, so that we can state
Proposition 4 Privatization always increases the attractiveness of the big country.
Proof. This result follows from an intuitive and straightforward argument. First of all, notice
that public and privatized firm behave identically on country A’s market. On the domestic
market, however, the privatized firm is a less aggressive competitor than the public firm, so
that the MNE faces a larger residual demand. Hence, independently of where FDI goes to,
18All the computations can be found in the Appendix.
18
local profits in B are higher when the incumbent is the privatized firm. This, in turn, implies
that the gain in profits from investing in B over A is always bigger than in the presence of
the public firm.
Privatization of the formerly-public firm makes it more likely that the foreign firm invests
in country B rather than A. In particular, when the incumbent in B is inefficient enough
(i.e., c0 >
1
2), the MNE always invests there and this, in turn, makes the privatized firm shut
down and leaves monopoly power to the MNE. By contrast, when the incumbent is not too
inefficient (i.e., c0 <
1
2), the privatized firm continues to produce – at least for the big country’s
market – in spite of the fact that it may have to face a more efficient competitor producing
locally.
Figure 7: Impact of privatization on country B’s welfare for n = 1, 2, 3
However, an FDI-attracting privatization does not necessarily make the big country better
off. This is clearly shown by Figure 7, which allows us to state
Proposition 5 Privatization always decreases welfare in the big country when it induces the
MNE to invest there if the privatized firm stays in the market.
Proof. To understand and prove such a sufficient condition, we can compare the worst
situation - in terms of country B’s welfare - before privatization with the best one after. Before
privatization, when FDI goes toA, the worst it can happen is to have a public monopoly serving
the domestic market. After privatization, the best situation is to have Cournot duopoly on
both countries’ markets.19
We divide our proof in two steps: first, we isolate the “pure privatization” effect on country
B’s welfare; then, we consider the “FDI-switch” effect on the privatized firm’s profits resulting
from privatization.
(i) When the incumbent firm is efficient enough (namely, c0 <
1
2), the total quantity pro-
duced for the big country’s market by a public monopoly, Q0M
B
= n (1− c0), is greater
19Before privatization, as the public firm always produces the same quantity in B, every market configuration
in which the MNE produces a positive quantity for that market increases welfare since the gain in consumer
surplus always exceeds the loss in public firm’s profits. For the same reason, after privatization, two firms
competing on the domestic market yield higher welfare than a monopoly; moreover, the privatized firm can
never be a monopolist on the foreign market.
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than that supplied by a private duopoly, QPD
B
= n3 (2− c0). Then, the sum of con-
sumer surplus and incumbent firm’s profits on the domestic market is always smaller
after privatization. Therefore, the “pure privatization” effect is negative for any market
configuration when c0 <
1
2 .
(ii) The FDI switch from A to B following privatization leads to a profit loss on the domestic
market and a profit gain on the foreign market for the privatized firm. The overall effect
turns out to be negative because of the “cost” and of the “market size” effects. To see
this, suppose that countries are symmetric so that the “market size” effect disappears.
If the MNE invests in B rather than A, privatized firm’s profits are lower because the
gain on the foreign market does not compensate for the loss on the domestic market.
Introducing market-size asymmetry makes such an argument even stronger since the loss
occurs in the bigger market.
To sum up, both the “pure privatization” and the “FDI-switch” effects have a negative
impact on country B’s welfare, and the condition c0 <
1
2 ensures that the privatized firm stays
in the market if the MNE invests in B. This completes the proof.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is that when privatization induces the MNE to invest
in the big country, the increase in profits for the incumbent firm can never compensate for the
loss in consumer surplus of domestic residents. Hence, welfare in the big country decreases.
It is thus evident that the decision of privatizing the public firm entails a trade-off for country
B between attractiveness and welfare.
We also want to stress that the big country’s welfare can decrease with FDI following
privatization despite the fact that the privatized firm remains entirely in the hands of domestic
residents. Indeed, if we allow for the possibility of foreign investors acquiring shares in the
formerly-public firm, the welfare-reducing impact of an FDI-attracting privatization would be
even stronger unless country B’s government is able to sell the firm at a value which fully
reflects its future profit earnings.
3.3 Tax/subsidy competition
We finally investigate how tax/subsidy competition between the two countries can affect the
investment decision of the MNE after privatization. The analysis in the present Section
parallels that in Section 2.3 where the incumbent in B is a public firm. As before, each
country sets a lump-sum tax/subsidy on the MNE’s profits and the equilibrium policy results
from an auction where the country making the most attractive offer receives the investment.
Figure 8 - which is drawn for the case n = 2 - is useful to illustrate the impact of tax/subsidy
competition both on the investment decision of the MNE and on welfare of the big country.
First, we clearly see that tax/subsidy competition enlarges the parameter space (τ, c0)
where the MNE chooses to invest in the small country. This is due to the fact that the big
country is less willing to subsidize the foreign firm than before privatization. This allows us
to claim
20
Figure 8: Impact of tax/subsidy competition after privatization for n = 2
Proposition 6 Following privatization, tax/subsidy competition increases the attractiveness
of the small country.
Proof. Suppose that the privatized firm produces the same quantity in B irrespective of where
the investment takes place. Then, the indifference condition for the MNE would correspond
to (14). However, the privatized firm’s reaction function is downward sloping. Hence, any
increase in the MNE’s output in B reduces the privatized firm’s quantity with a negative
effect both on its profits and on country B’s consumer surplus. From the “FDI-switch” effect
(Proof of Proposition 5), we know that if the MNE invests in B rather than A, the gain in
privatized firm’s profits on the foreign market does not compensate for the loss on the domestic
market. This is enough to conclude that ΠA + Smax
A
> ΠB + Smax
B
when ΠA = ΠB.
After privatization of the public firm, the big country is less eager to attract FDI than
before. Hence, the small country will represent a more attractive location for the investment
and can even succeed in hosting the MNE by taxing away part of its profit gain from investing
there. Intuitively, the net effect on country B’s welfare of receiving FDI can now be negative
since the gain in consumer surplus could not be sufficient to counteract the loss in domestic
firm profits. This implies that the big country may be willing to tax the MNE in order to
discourage it from investing there and to protect the domestic industry from more efficient
foreign competitors. Such a result puts forward an argument for the “protectionist” role of
tax/subsidy competition for FDI. Moreover, it is consistent with the finding by Bjorvatn and
Eckel (2006) according to which the big country may gain from not receiving FDI when its
market size is relatively large. However, our conclusions are more general than theirs in that
the privatized firm in the big country can be either as efficient as or less efficient than the
foreign MNE.
Secondly, Figure 8 suggests that tax/subsidy competition allows the big country to reduce
the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. We summarize this result
in
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Proposition 7 Tax/subsidy competition decreases the negative impact of privatization on wel-
fare since the big country can tax away part of the MNE’s gain in profits from investing there.
Intuitively, privatization dramatically increases the attractiveness of the big country, so that
it is extremely beneficial for the MNE to invest there instead of investing in the small country.
This, in turn, implies that country B can tax away part of the profit gain from investing there
(without changing the FDI decision of the foreign firm), thereby increasing welfare above the
no policy competition level.20
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed how the FDI decision of a foreign MNE and tax/subsidy
competition for FDI between countries of different market size are affected by the presence in
the big market of a welfare-maximizing and relatively inefficient public firm operating in the
same sector as the foreign investor. In addition, we have studied the effects of privatization on
attractiveness and welfare of the big country but also on the outcome of the policy competition
game between the two countries.
In the first instance, we have shown that when the incumbent in the big market is a public
rather than a private firm, both countries always benefit from receiving the investment of the
MNE. In particular, differently from Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), when the MNE locates in
the big country, the gain in consumer surplus of domestic residents is always greater than the
loss in profits for the domestic firm. Hence, both governments are always ready to offer a
subsidy to attract FDI. However, when the public firm does not export to the small country
(either a priori or due to entry of the MNE on the regional market), tax/subsidy competition
turns out to be irrelevant to the investment decision of the foreign firm. This implies that
if the country receiving the investment has to pay a subsidy, only the MNE will gain from
policy competition provided that it would have invested there anyway. This also means that
the FDI decision of the MNE absent policy competition maximizes aggregate welfare (i.e., the
sum of the two countries’ welfare and the foreign firm’s profits). By contrast, when the public
firm exports to the small country (even after entry of the foreign MNE in the region), policy
competition increases the attractiveness of the big country. In this case, indeed, there is an
extra-benefit from receiving FDI for the big country because the public firm will have to face
a weaker competitor on the small market. As a result, the maximum subsidy the big country
is willing to offer now exceeds the small country’s one when the MNE is indifferent in the
absence of policy competition.
As a second step, we have found that privatization of the public firm may entail a trade-
off between attractiveness and welfare from the big country’s perspective. On the one hand,
20We must stress that policy competition does not prevent country B’s welfare to decrease as a result of an
FDI-attracting privatization when countries are symmetric (n = 1). In such a situation, indeed, country B is
always willing to offer a subsidy (in equilibrium) which lowers its net-of-subsidy welfare below the corresponding
level in the absence of policy competition.
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privatization makes the big country a relatively more attractive location for the foreign MNE
since the privatized firm is a much less aggressive competitor than the public firm on its
domestic market. On the other hand, when the privatized firm stays in the market after
investment of the MNE in the big country, welfare always decreases relative to the before-
privatization scenario. This is due to the fact that the increase in profits for the local firm
can never compensate for the decrease in consumer surplus of domestic residents. In our
model, privatization does not entail any efficiency gain.21 However, the fundamental trade-off
between attractiveness and welfare is robust to the assumption that privatization allows the
domestic firm to produce at the same cost level as the MNE. In fact, it is possible to show
that for high values of c0 and τ , privatization with full efficiency gains increases welfare but
induces the MNE to invest in the other country, while the opposite occurs for low values of
the two parameters. Attractiveness and welfare simultaneously increase only for intermediate
values.
We have also discussed the interaction between privatization and tax/subsidy competition
and put forward the role policy competition may play in protecting one country’s domestic
industry from efficient foreign competitors. As (after privatization) the net effect on welfare
of receiving the investment can be negative, the big country can be willing to tax the MNE
in order to discourage FDI from taking place there. This, in turn, increases the attractiveness
of the small country. Such a result generalizes the finding by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006)
to a set-up where the incumbent private firm can be less efficient than the foreign MNE.
Finally, we have pointed out that tax/subsidy competition can attenuate the negative impact
of privatization on welfare since the big country may be able to tax away part of the profit
gain for the MNE from investing there.
To sum up, the presence of a public firm (although relatively inefficient) is a strong disin-
centive to invest in a country even if the latter represents a large market. In this case, policy
competition is not useful to attract FDI if the public firm just serves its domestic market.
Moreover, privatization per se is not necessarily “good news” from the big country’s per-
spective as it might attract FDI while decreasing welfare. However, allowing for tax/subsidy
competition after privatization seems to be an improvement to the extent that it endows the
big country with an instrument which it can use either to protect its local producers from
tough foreign competitors or to extract part of the rents the foreign firm earns by locating
there.
21Indeed, the empirical evidence in this respect is mixed and the variance of the results is substantial (Cuervo
and Villalonga, 2000). By contrast, there is general agreement on the fact that liberalization processes and
increased competition enhance efficiency. See, for example, the meta-reviews of Villalonga (2000), Megginson
and Netter (2001), and Willner (2001), that report the results of hundreds of empirical papers on privatization.
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Appendix
Investment decision with a public firm in B
When FDI goes to A, the MNE will behave as a monopolist on that market if the public
firm does not export to the small country or as a duopolist if it does. Hence, the price to
consumers in country A is given by either pA =
1
2 or pA =
1+c0+τ
3 , respectively. In country B,
the public firm will behave as a monopolist if the MNE does not export to the big country or
as a duopolist if it does, implying pB = c0 or pB =
c0+τ
2 , respectively. When FDI goes to B,
instead, the MNE will always behave as a duopolist on that market where it has to compete
with the incumbent public firm. Hence, the price to consumers in country B is always given by
pB =
c0
2 . In country A, the MNE will behave as a monopolist if the public firm does not export
to that country or as a duopolist if it does, implying pA =
1+τ
2 or pA =
1+c0+2τ
3 , respectively.
Straightforward computations allow us to derive profits of the MNE from investing in country
A or in country B and the corresponding welfare in the two countries, which we summarize
in the Table below.
FDI in A
Market in A, B ΠA + F WA
A
WA
B
Mon, CN 1
4
+
n(c0−τ)
2
4
1
8
n(2−c0−τ)
2
8
− n(1−c0)(c0−τ)
2
CN, CN
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
+
n(c0−τ)
2
4
(2−c0−τ)
2
18
n(2−c0−τ)
2
8
+
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
− n(1−c0)(c0−τ)
2
CN, Pub Mon
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
(2−c0−τ)
2
18
n(1−c0)
2
2
+
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
Mon, Pub Mon 1
4
1
8
n(1−c0)
2
2
FDI in B
Market in A, B ΠB + F WB
A
WB
B
Mon, CN (1−τ)
2
4
+
nc2
0
4
(1−τ)2
8
n(2−c0)
2
8
− n(1−c0)c0
2
CN, CN
(1+c0−τ)
2
9
+
nc2
0
4
(2−c0−2τ)
2
18
n(2−c0)
2
8
+
(1−2c0−τ)
2
9
− n(1−c0)c0
2
Table 3: Profits and welfare from FDI in A or in B with a public firm in B
We define the difference in operating profits of the MNE between investing in B and in A
as ∆Π ≡ ΠB − ΠA and country j’s welfare gain of receiving FDI as ∆Wj ≡ W jj −W kj , for
j, k = A,B, j 6= k. It is then easy to determine the value of these variables in the relevant
areas of the parameter space (τ, c0) by using Table 3.
Investment decision with a privatized firm in B
After privatization, the MNE’s behavior on the small market is the same as in the presence
of a public firm. However, the way firms compete in the big country changes. When FDI
goes to A, the privatized firm will behave as a monopolist if the MNE does not export to the
big country or as a duopolist if it does, implying pB =
1+c0
2 or pB =
1+c0+τ
3 , respectively.
In addition, the MNE can enjoy monopoly power in B (even by investing in A) since the
privatized firm does not want to run losses; in this case, pB =
1+τ
2 . When FDI goes to B,
instead, the MNE will always behave either as a duopolist or as a monopolist on that market
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FDI in A
Market in A, B ΠA + F WA
A
WA
B
Mon, CN 1
4
+
n(1+c0−2τ)
2
9
1
8
n(2−c0−τ)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0+τ)
2
9
CN, CN
(1+c0+τ)
2
9
+
n(1+c0−2τ)
2
9
(2−c0−τ)
2
18
n(2−c0−τ)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0+τ)
2
9
+
(1−2c0−2τ)
2
9
Mon, Mon 1
4
+ n(1−τ)
2
4
1
8
n(1−τ)2
8
Mon, Priv Mon 1
4
1
8
n(1−τ)2
8
+
n(1−c0)
2
4
FDI in B
Market in A, B ΠB + F WB
A
WB
B
Mon, Mon (1−τ)
2
4
+ n
4
(1−τ)2
8
n
8
Mon, CN (1−τ)
2
4
+
n(1+c0)
2
9
(1−τ)2
8
n(2−c0)
2
18
+
n(1−2c0)
2
9
CN, CN
(1+c0−τ)
2
9
+
n(1+c0)
2
9
(2−c0−2τ)
2
18
n(2−c0)
2
18
+
(1−2c0−τ)
2
9
+
n(1−2c0)
2
9
Table 4: Profits and welfare from FDI in A or in B with a privatized firm in B
where the incumbent privatized firm produces as long as it earns nonnegative profits. Hence,
the price to consumers in country B is given by either pB =
1+c0
3 or pB =
1
2 . Straightforward
computations allow us to derive profits of the MNE from investing in country A or in country
B and the corresponding welfare in the two countries. Finally, we determine profit and welfare
differentials in the relevant areas by using Table 4, which summarizes all the possible values
of the variables we are interested in.
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